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Abstract: This paper aims to theoretically analyse recent health system reforms. Generally patients 
are free to choose, within the region they live in, the best provider among the private “accredited” 
and public ones. 
The criterion patients use to choose the provider which fits their expectations best is not, at least in a 
tax financed system, the price of the treatment since patients do not pay directly for the treatment 
they receive. 
Crucial in determining their choice is the quality level and the provider spatial location. 
In a normative perspective we want to analyse hospitals’ Nash/Counot and Stackelberg equilibriums 
in a Hotelling spatial competition scenario. 
Because of asymmetric information,  patients could be unable to observe the true quality provided. 
Thus the demand for health care services is assumed to depend on a perceived quality (different from 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine, in a very simple setting, the equilibrium outcomes 
when hospitals compete on quality in order to get an efficient number of patients. 
Patient behaviour is investigated when they need health care services. The “health good” is 
horizontally and vertically differentiated. According to Hotelling (1929) spatial competition model, 
we assume that only two hospitals serve the market. They are located at the extremes of a line unit 
length and patients are uniformly distributed on that line. The health services provided by the two 
hospitals are characterised by different quality levels. 
A tax financed health system is supposed where patients do not pay directly for the health 
care services they receive. The purchaser is assumed to be a government agency who freely chooses 
contract terms and payment form. 
This paper studies the case when a prospective payment is implemented and patients are free 
to choose the hospital they prefer, i.e. the quality/distance mix that allows for utility maximisation. 
This framework is motivated by the fact that we believe it best represents the health market 
features. We jointly study the hospital’s and consumer’s behaviour which maximise respectively 
profit and utility functions.  
The goal is a better understanding of recent health system reforms which introduce 
prospective payment scheme (DRG based) and free choice by patients
1. The expected outcome is 
efficiency in production and a high quality level. The former should be obtained by the prospective 
payment scheme, the latter should be obtained by the demand mechanism, consistent with natural 
competition between providers for the marginal consumer. Providers need to increase the quality 
supplied to get the marginal patient and consequently increase their demand. 
This paper is complementary to the existing literature both in health and industrial economics.  
Gravelle (1999) analyses the competition amongst providers in the private and public systems 
for the quality of service and the number of care providers. The paper focuses on capitation 
contracts in which providers receive an initial payment for each patient who registers with them. It 
is concerned with the way in which competition between providers affects the quality of service 
and, via the number of providers, patient access to services. 
Gravelle and Masiero (2000) investigate the case when general practitioners are horizontally 
and vertically differentiated and compete for patients via their imperfect observed quality. They 
consider the extent to which switching costs and imperfect patient information about quality interact 
to blunt incentives for quality. Patients improve their knowledge of the characteristics of the 
practice they join after experiencing its services. There are initial errors in judging quality and 
                                                 
1 e.g. the Italian case 3 
switching costs which lock some of the mistaken patients into the wrong GP. Furthermore they are 
interested in whether competition between general practitioners leads to appropriate levels of 
information and switching costs or whether additional regulation is required. They are concerned 
with errors and welfare consequences. 
 
An application of the standard Hotelling spatial competition model to the secondary health 
care market in order to study the different hospital strategies and the Cournot/Stackelberg 
equilibrium outcomes under a prospective payment scheme, has not been analysed to our 
knowledge. 
With reference to the literature in industrial economics, there are a number of papers studying 
the features of  Cournot and Stackelberg’s leader-follower model of oligopoly. Beato and Mas-
Colell (1984) find that, under specific assumptions, the stackelberg’s leader turns out to be the loser. 
The present study will provide the same odd result. 
In section 2, we introduce the consumer utility function. It is affected by distance and quality 
provided. The identification of the marginal consumer allows us to define the demand each hospital 
faces. In section 3, we investigate the hospital profit function and its behaviour. The subsequent 
sections 4 and  5 show respectively the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibriums. In section 6, we 
present a dynamic extension of  the Stackelberg equilibrium. We then introduce the implications of 
uncertainty and we analyse how it affects the outcomes already found. Section 8 summarises our 
conclusions. 4 
 
2.  The consumer utility function  
The study refers to a single DRG (Diagnosis Related Group). 
Only two hospitals serve the market. They are located at the extremes of a line unit length. 






Patient utility function depends on the quality they receive for treatment and on the provider’s 

















α denotes how quality enters the utility function 
γ denotes the disutility because of the distance (d) 
 
Patients will be indifferent between hospital A and hospital B when: 
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The distance d represents the demand for hospital A and, at the same time, the location of the 
marginal consumer. 
We can easily observe that  
If d=1/2 (the middle of the unit length line) then hospitals are offering exactly the same 
quality: qa=qb  
If d=0 then the demand for hospital A converges to zero:  
qa=qb-γ/α 
qb =qa+γ/α 
All the patients demand treatment at hospital B. 
 
If d=1 then the opposite (of the previous case) occurs: 
qa=qb+γ/α 
(1-d)  d 
HA  HB5 
qb =qa-γ/α 
All patients demand treatment from hospital A. Hospital A’s quality level, if compared with 
B’s, compensates the disutility because of the greater distance patients have to cover. Only the 
patient situated in d=1 (i.e. the marginal one) will be indifferent between hospital A and B. 
 
In general “health” is considered as a good that cannot be given up. Nonetheless we assume 
that if the quality level each hospital can offer is lower than a minimum level (normalised to zero) 
patients prefer not to receive any treatment provided that the risks they incur are bigger than the 
disease they suffer from the treatment. 
In other words when qi  is lower than zero, the hospital providing that quality level faces zero 
demand regardless of the quality provided by its rival. 
Similarly, patients ask for health services only when the expected utility is at least as great as 
the reservation utility U . 













To simplify the analysis we set the reservation utility equal to zero. 
 
To take into account the participation constraint, we need to rewrite the equation for distance 
(or equivalently the demand equation) as follows: 
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where  
D1 is a dummy variable which assumes value 0 when qi=qj and value 1 when qi≠qj. 
D2 is a dummy variable which assumes value 1 when qi=qj and value 0 when qi≠qj. 
 
It is easy to verify that all the statements above hold for the new demand equation (see 
appendix 1 for details). 6 
3.  The hospital’s behaviour 
The hospital maximises its profit function. It is self-interested and it is concerned with quality 
through the demand mechanism. 
Because of the payment scheme adopted by the purchaser (fixed price per treated patient), the 
hospital receives an ex ante defined price M  per treated patient. M is set to satisfy the hospital’s 
participation constraint. M has to be great enough to cover all the costs the hospital incurs in 
treating di patients at qi (i= a, b) quality level. 
We consider the analysis refers to a single Drg (diagnosis related group), that is, patients with 
the same disease and an equivalent (on average) amount of resources required to be treated. 
Given M, the hospitals will set quality level in order to maximise their profits. Through the q 
variable hospitals can control demand. 
We assume symmetric information on cost and revenue functions. 
  
Revenues are given by the ex-ante-fixed-price-per-treated-patient times the number of 
patients. In this case the number of patients is equal to the demand for health services. 
The demand hospital i faces is: 
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Defining M the fixed price, the hospital’s revenues (R) are: 
j i
b a i







where M is exogenous to the hospital and arbitrarily chosen by the purchaser. 
 
The monetary costs (C) to hospital i are: 
) ), , ( ( i j i i i q q q d C  
Costs depend on the number of patients and on the quality level provided. The demand d 
depends both on the quality offered by hospital A and hospital B. Thus we can rewrite the cost 
function in its explicit form directly as: 
(3)  i
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q











+ − =  
where  
c is a cost parameter associated to the number of patients and to the quality provided. 
 
Fi are the fixed costs of  i-th  hospital. 7 
 
The hospital will maximise the following profit function: 
(4)
U d q q U
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where s indicates the s-patient and ds its distance from the hospital. 
In this simple framework the only variable the hospital can set is qi. 8 
4. Cournot  equilibrium 
We suppose the two hospitals compete on quality.  
We suppose symmetric information on revenues and cost functions. Hospitals behave 
independently. 
Because they face the same cost and the same revenues they reach a symmetric equilibrium, 
i.e. an equivalent reaction function. 










q q q j j i  
Hospital i sets its quality level according to a few elements. The quality increases in the 
competitor’s quality, in the fixed price and in the parameter associated to the quality relevance in 
patient utility function, it decreases in the cost parameter and in the distance patient disutility.   
The behaviour of  hospital B is perfectly symmetric to the behaviour of hospital A. 
We are considering the Cournot case. Functions for qa and qb represent the reaction function 
for each hospital. 


































q q b a  
The two hospitals will behave symmetrically and will choose the same quality level. The 
quality provided can be shifted by the purchaser through the fixed price M. The quality is 
decreasing in c (the cost parameter), decreasing in γ (the patient distance disutility) and increasing 
in α (patient utility for quality). 
A bigger value of M allows for a quality rise. If γ is high, then demand will result inelastically 
with respect to quality. The hospital’s control of demand through quality is low. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, the hospital’s incentives to increase quality because of the demand mechanism is low. 
 
The purchaser sets M in order to meet the hospital participation constraint. Considering the 
hospital is forced to choose a quality level above the minimum enforceable, the fixed price M has to 




M =  then both hospital A and hospital B will choose a quality level equal to zero value.  































we verify that when quality is set to zero, the hospitals face a negative profit ( i i F − = Π ) equal 
to fixed costs. In fact, with a zero quality the patient participation constraint cannot be satisfied and 
no patient demands health care services. 
The minimum quality level to cover all the market and to equally share patients is: 





M = , i.e. a price M  50% bigger than the previous one. 
If the purchaser sets M according to the above equation, he will meet both the hospital and the 
patient participation constraint. 
Recalling that da=db=1/2 and that, given M equal to3cγ/2α, qa=qb=γ/2α, we can derive the 












5. Stackelberg  equilibrium 
In this section we assume a two stage game. Hospital A can move first, taking into account 
the reaction of hospital B. According to the literature we define hospital A as the  leader and 
hospital B as the follower. 
Usually the leader can get a better outcome than the follower because of its advantage: the 
leader moves first and he acts taking into account the follower’s reaction. 
Substituting B’s reaction function in A’s demand function, we derive a new demand for A 
only depending on quality A. 
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The leader maximises: 
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Thus we can write the Lagrangean: 
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Using Kuhn-Tucker we get the following first order conditions: 



























Solving the problem (see appendix 3 for details) we get a result where the two hospitals 



















Because the quality provided by the follower is greater than the leader quality, the follower 
will serve a greater portion of the market: 
8 / 3 = a d
 
8 / 5 = b d
 
Looking at the profit we observe a very odd result: 
F
c














In this scenario the leader is the loser. 
The counterintuitive outcome we get comes from the two stage game we have defined. The 
hospitals compete on quality, given the fixed price per treated patient. The hospital which sets first 
its quality level loses, even if it can take into account the competitor reaction function. 
In fact, the follower observes the leader setting its quality. In the second stage of the game, 
the follower sets its quality level solving its profit maximisation problem. The hospital will find it 
profitable to set its quality equal to the rival’s quality plus a bit (i.e. plus γ/4α). 
In this way the follower covers a bigger portion of the market line and can increase its profits 
serving the marginal consumers. 
In this scenario, where both hospitals face the same cost and revenue functions, the hospital 




It is interesting to compare the Cournot and the Stackelberg equilibriums found. 
 12 
COURNOT STACKELBERG 
qa=qb=M/c-γ/α q a=M/c-3γ/2α 
qb=qa=M/c-γ/α q b=M/c-5γ/4α 
M=3cγ/2α M=15cγ/8α 
qb=qa=γ/2α q a=3γ/8α; qb=5γ/8α 
πa=πb=cγ/2α-F  πa=9cγ/16α-F; 
πb=25cγ/32α-F 
 
From the social welfare point of view we can state that the Cournot equilibrium is more 
efficient than the Stackelberg one. 
Given the same value of M in the two scenarios, we observe that the quality provided by each 
hospital in the Stackelberg case is lower than the quality provided in the Cournot one. 
If the purchaser wants all the patients placed along the unit length line to meet their 
participation constraint, then he has to pay a higher price (M
S>M
C) with Stackelberg competition. 
Nonetheless, the higher value of M, the general amount of quality provided in the two 
scenarios, is exactly the same. In the first case the two hospitals provide the same amount of quality, 
in the second the leader provides a lower level of quality than the follower, but in both cases the 
quality provided sums to γ/α. 
Because of the difference in the quality level and in the fixed price, the profit each hospital 
can attain in the Stackelberg case is always greater than hospitals can get in Cournot equilibrium. 
To conclude, we can state that the Stackelberg competition is more profitable for the hospitals 
than the Cournot competition, but from the purchaser (i.e. the social welfare) point of view the 
opposite applies. 13 
6.  Extending the Stackelberg equilibrium 
The Stackelberg case can be extended dynamically. 
The equilibrium outcome we have found is not dynamically stable. The hospitals will move 
from it in the next stage of the game. 
If we preserve the game structure of the equilibrium, we can assume the leader will be able to 
react to the follower behaviour in the subsequent stage of the game. The leader will respond to the 
follower’s quality, maximising a new objective function where the competitor’s quality is given. 
In this way we define a third stage new equilibrium. This equilibrium will change again in the 
fourth stage when the follower will move after the leader’s quality observation. 
We can summarise the game by the following table: 
 
1 equilibrium outcome (1
st stage)  
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The follower reacts 
setting (2
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2 equilibrium outcome (3
rd stage) 
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3 equilibrium outcome (4
th stage) 






















The leader’s new 
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4 equilibrium outcome (5
th stage) 
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5 equilibrium outcome (6
th stage) 
The follower reacts 
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Hospitals’ dynamic competition converges towards the Cournot Equilibrium. 
In the long-run hospitals competing in a multi stage game produce the same result as in the 
Cournot equilibrium. 
As we can easily observe from the graphs above, we note that the profits and the market 
shares and the quality level converge, in the long-run dynamics, towards the Cournot outcomes. 
 
This result implies that the Cournot case is more efficient, at least from the social welfare 
point of view; it reaches the desirable stable equilibrium outcome in the first stage of the game and 




In health care market, patients are generally unable to perfectly observe the true quality level 
provided. Thus the demand for health care services is assumed to depend on a perceived quality. 
Expectations and errors are introduced in the model. 
The new patient utility function depends on provider distance and on perceived quality, 
different from true quality. 
) , ~ ( d q u U pz =  
where 
q ~ is the perceived quality 
d   is the distance 
 
and 
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The patient chooses hospital i when the expected utility from the uncertain quality  i q ~ is bigger 
than expected utility from hospital j with uncertain quality  j q ~ : 
)] , ~ ( [ )] , ~ ( [ d q u E d q u E b a ≥  
If we assume a bounded uncertainty, i.e. the “random” quality q ~ is very close to the expected 
quality  ) ~ (q E q = for every state of the world, then we can use the following approximation: 
2
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Using expectations: 
2
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In order not to change the functions employed we apply directly the average-variance method. 
If we suppose the perceived quality as equally and normally distributed with q mean and 
2







































Patient utility is increasing in average quality, decreasing in distance and quality variance. 
 
The demand the hospital i faces is defined as 
 
In the new scenario, patients cannot observe the true quality level provided. 
They maximise an expected utility function where two new elements enter: the perceived 
quality mean and variance. 
Obviously the resulting demand for each hospital will not depend directly upon the quality 
provided because of the observation bias. 
Under the hypothesis that hospitals’ control is limited to the quality choice variable, they will 
behave in the same way as in the deterministic scenario, but with a different expected payoff.  
 
Under Cournot competition, hospitals maximise the quality according to eq.(4). but the profit 
function is given by: 
(7)
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If the average quality is assumed equal to the true quality, knowing they will provide the same 
quality level, we can rewrite the profit function: 
(8)  i i q q q q i F q c M

















Equation (8) shows the relevance assumed by the quality variance in determining the hospital 
profit. 
The quality hospital variance has two main effects: 
it increases the quality level required to meet the patient participation constraint and, given a 
specific quality level, a lower variance with respect to the competitor, allows for higher profits. 
Thus, even if the hospitals choose the same quality level, a higher share of the market can be 
served and, consequently, different profits can be attained. 
 
In the Stackelber competition the uncertainty determines a better outcome.  
We have shown in the previous section that the follower uses information concerning leader’s 
quality to steal, by a small increase in his quality level (with respect to his rival), the marginal 
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is not enough to grant them the marginal consumer. Because of observation bias, they are conscious 
a small difference is not easily observable by patients. 
In the long run deterministic case, the Stackelberg equilibrium moves towards the Cournot 
outcomes. In the stochastic scenario it is reasonable to expect a faster convergence to the Cournot 
stable equilibrium since the competition on small quality differences could turn out to be useless if 
not harmful; as the cost function depends on real quality while the revenue function depends on 
perceived quality. 
 
Hospitals have an interest in controlling variance and reducing asymmetric information. 
Reducing their quality variance would determine a direct increase in profit. Thus they will 
invest money in “information activity”. For example they could prefer advertising expenditure to 
quality increase (Montefiori 2002). 
 
We observe from the model that both the hospitals and the purchaser have an interest in 
reducing information asymmetry.  
Hospitals aim to reduce the variance in quality in order to boost their demand, the purchaser 




The recent health system reforms (e.g. the case of Italy) have introduced a prospective 
payment scheme (DRG based) and free choice by patients. The expected outcome is efficiency in 
production and a high quality level. 
The former should be obtained by the prospective payment scheme, the latter should be 
obtained by the demand mechanism, consistent with natural competition between providers for the 
marginal consumer. Providers need to increase the quality supplied to get the marginal patient and 
consequently increase their demand. 
The spatial hospital competition for quality provides very different results depending on the 
theoretical competition model implemented. 
The Cournot scenario allows for hospitals’ positive profits. When the purchaser aims to 
maximise the social welfare function, his main concern should be to meet the marginal-consumer-
participation-constraint, i.e. to cover all the unit length line market. He will get this goal defining 
the fixed-price-per-treated-patient as suggested in the model and in such a way to meet both the 
hospital individual rationality constraint and indirectly (through the hospital’s behaviour) the patient 
participation constraint. 
The price the purchaser sets in the prospective payment scheme allows for a quality level 
above the minimum enforceable level normalised to zero. 
At that quality level, the marginal consumer who is, in the Cournot competition, situated 
exactly in the middle of the unit length line market, gets a non-negative utility payoff and he will 
ask for health care services indifferently from hospital A or hospital B. 
If we shift to a multi-stage  game allowing for a Stackelberg leader and for a follower, we 
verify a very odd result. The Stackelberg leader turns out to be the loser. 
From a social welfare point of view we observe the Stackelberg equilibrium as inefficient 
with respect to the Cournot equilibrium. 
The purchaser needs to set a higher price per treated patient in order to cover all the unit 
length market. Furthermore the total amount of quality provided is exactly the same (lower with the 
same value of M and consequently with some marginal patients unable to meet their participation 
constraint). 
Both the hospitals get a higher profit, thanks to the higher price accorded. 
Proceeding in our analysis we check that the Stackelberg equilibrium is not dynamically 
stable. If we allow for further stages, it moves from the first unstable point towards a stable one. 
The stable point will be attained after several iterations and it will coincide with the Cournot 
equilibrium outcome. 20 
Thus we can state that the Cournot equilibrium represents the long run stable Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
The purchaser doesn’t benefit from these dynamic adjustments which drive towards a more 
efficient solution only after several steps, i.e. after a long period of time. On the other hand the 
long-run equilibrium determines a higher social cost (because of the short-run deficiencies and the 
higher M required). 
Because of asymmetric information, patients are unable to observe the true quality. Thus it is 
necessary to assume that demand for health care services depends on a perceived quality (different 
from the true quality). 
In the second section of this paper we change the patient utility function to explain the effects 
of information asymmetry in the health care market. 
Analysing the Cournot scenario under uncertainty, it is possible to verify that hospitals don’t 
have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium. We expect the hospitals to provide the same true 
quality level. Because of asymmetric information, patients are unable to observe the true quality and 
their choice will be driven by perceived quality. Hospitals can face different demand (they could 
lose the marginal consumer), even providing the same quality level, and consequently different 
profits. 
The Cournot equilibrium is stable in the long run. 
Under Stackelberg competition the uncertainty determines a better outcome. 
Because in the long run it moves towards the Cournot outcomes, it is reasonable to expect a 
faster convergence to it, since competing in small quality differences could turn out to be useless, if 




This paper is intended to provide a theoretical contribution to the information asymmetry 
issue but the results attained can be used for practical applications. 
The public purchaser can choose a fixed price per patient in order to get all the market 
demand satisfied. According to the model this price will be able to push the quality level upwards 
(above the minimum enforceable level) in order to meet the marginal consumer participation 
constraint. The purchaser allows for the hospitals to make positive profits. It means that a social 
welfare function, as defined for example in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a), cannot be 
maximised. 
To conclude we can state that the public purchaser can choose a fixed price per patient in 
order to attain the desired level of quality but the social welfare is not at the optimal level. 21 
We observe from the model that both the hospitals and the purchaser have an interest in 
reducing the information asymmetry.  
Hospitals aim to reduce the variance in quality in order to boost their demand, the purchaser 
aims to decrease uncertainty to avoid hospital incentives on quality curbing. 
 
These conclusions are supported by the fact that many countries are introducing prospective 
payment schemes and free choice by patients in addition to the provision of a wider range of 
information directed at citizens. 
 22 
Appendix 1 














+ − =  
where 
D1 is a dummy variable which assumes value 0 if qa=qb and value 1 otherwise 
D2 is a dummy variable which assumes value 1 if qa=qb and value 0 otherwise. 
If the hospitals offer the same quality level, then the market is equally shared between them: 
2 / 1 =
=
d
q q j i  




= = j i q q  
The value set for quality is the minimum that allows the two hospitals to share the market and 
get the marginal patient situated in the middle of the line. 
 
d=0 means that the demand for hospital A is zero, while B can cover all the market [(1-d)=1]. 
In this case we necessarily observe two different quality levels, thus  j i q q ≠ . 
























All patients located on the line prefer hospital A to hospital B. They generally receive a utility 
at least as great as the one they receive going to hospital B, independently from the location. 
Obviously, the closer they are to the provider, lower the distance disutility is and the bigger the net 
utility they receive. 
As demonstrated, the new formulation does not change the result but it takes into account the 
patient participation constraint. 23 
Appendix 2 
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The purchaser will set 
α
γ c
M ≥  in order to meet the hospital’s participation constraint and 
taking into account that the hospital cannot provide a quality level below the minimum enforceable 
level, set equal to zero. 
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Looking at eq.2 we observe that the quality will be strictly greater than zero if the purchaser 
of health services sets M<3γc/α. 
Eq.1 suggests that when M>3γc/2α-3γλ/2 then the quality level will be greater than zero. The 
purchaser knows the range within to choose the price M. If the provider is a government agency 
which aims to maximise the social welfare function and the social welfare decreases in taxes (we 
are in a tax financed system), then we can assume the constraint not binding, i.e. M<3γc/α. 
Furthermore, if we want eq.2 to be nested in eq.1 in order to set λ equal to zero, we require 
M>15γc/8α, i.e. when M is greater or equal to that value we see that the constraint is not binding 
and the first equation ensures a quality at least as great as the one required by the constraint. 







is always satisfied if the purchaser sets M lower than  




Because of this result, the Lagrangean multiplier (λ)  is zero in order to satisfy the 
complementary slackness condition: 
 







Because the provider’s goal is to get the desired quality level at minimum cost, he will set the 
fixed price M equal to 15γc/8α. 
 
Thus, because qa is greater than zero, the complementary slackness condition for the first 
equation

























Turning the attention to the follower reaction function we can define the quality level 










We can observe that qb>qa. 
 
Easily we can obtain the values of da and db: 
da=3/8 
db=5/8 
Hospital B setting a higher quality level than hospital A serves a larger demand for health 
treatment. 
 
Substituting the demand values in the profit functions we get: 
F
c















Surprisingly the leader gets a lower profit than the follower. 
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